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COMMENT 
HIDDEN BENEATH THE WAVES OF IMMIGRATION 
DEBATE: 
SAN FRANCISCO’S SANCTUARY ORDINANCE 
Jennifer L. Gregorin† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The summer of 2010 represented a tumultuous time of debate and 
uncertainty in America’s immigration law as the Nation’s attention was 
captivated by the fate of Arizona’s controversial immigration law.1 On July 
28, 2010, after filing suit against the State of Arizona because the State’s 
immigration law was allegedly unconstitutional and preempted by federal 
law, the United States Department of Justice (“Justice Department”) secured 
an injunction to prevent enforcement of certain sections of the Arizona 
law.2 Not long after the injunction, the United States Department of State 
(“State Department”) sent a human rights report to the United Nations.3 
                                                                                                                                      
 † Notes and Comments Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW; J.D. Candidate, 
Liberty University School of Law, May 2012; B.S., Northland International University, May 
2009. Special thanks to the LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Volume 5 Editorial Board and 
Senior Staff who encouraged the Candidates and Jr. Staff to strive for excellence and to the 
Volume 6 Editorial Board and Staff for their patience in editing this Comment. 
 1. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). Senate Bill 1070 is also known as the 
“Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act.” Id. § 13. The legislature 
stated its intent for the bill in Section 1: 
The legislature finds that there is a compelling interest in the cooperative 
enforcement of federal immigration laws throughout all of Arizona. The 
legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through 
enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies in 
Arizona. The provisions of this act are intended to work together to discourage 
and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by 
persons unlawfully present in the United States.  
Id. § 1. 
 2. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010) (granting in 
part and denying in part the Justice Department’s preliminary injunction). 
 3. State Department Stands By Decision to Include Arizona in U.N. Human Rights 
Report, FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/08/30/state-
department-stands-decision-include-arizona-human-rights-report (providing reactions 
from Arizona officials to the State Department including a report on the Arizona 
immigration controversy in a report to the United Nations and relating how the State 
Department supported its report); see also UN at a Glance, UNITED NATIONS, 
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The report included an example of America’s process for resolving a social 
issue under the rule of law.4 The State Department proffered to the United 
Nations the Justice Department’s lawsuit against the State of Arizona in 
response to Arizona’s immigration law.5 Through the report, the State 
Department wanted America to be an example for the rest of the world.6 
The federal government disapproves of Arizona’s immigration law 
because the law is allegedly preempted by federal law,7 but the federal 
government allows cities to pass laws and adopt policies that expressly 
discourage or prevent local law enforcement officers and government 
employees from complying with federal immigration laws.8 Cities that 
prohibit local law enforcement or other employees from enforcing 
immigration laws to the fullest extent allowed by the federal government are 
commonly referred to as sanctuary cities.9 The discrepancy between the 
Justice Department’s condemning Arizona’s immigration law and 
concomitantly condoning sanctuary city policies creates a legal conundrum.  
Many cities in the United States represent express or implied sanctuary 
cities, and San Francisco represents one city that has expressly declared 
itself a sanctuary city.10 This Comment examines the history of American 
sanctuary cities and focuses specifically on the unconstitutionality of San 
Francisco’s sanctuary city policy.  Section II discusses the background of 
American sanctuary cities, addresses the semantics of the term, and follows 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). In 1945, after World War 
II, the United Nations was founded as an international organization with the goal of 
promoting international peace and security. Id. Through its organizations and programs, it 
works in various areas such as refugee protection, disaster relief, counter terrorism, and 
human rights. Id. Currently, the United Nations has 193 member states. Id. 
 4. State Department Stands by Decision, supra note 3. 
 5. Id. (noting Arizona officials’ outrage at the American government’s submitting 
Arizona’s “duly enacted laws” to the United Nations for review).  
 6. Id. 
 7. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 986. 
 8. See Debra J. Saunders, Free pass for sanctuary cities?, SFGATE.COM (July 27, 2010), 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-07-27/opinion/21999142 (noting the irony of a lawsuit 
against Arizona’s enforcement of immigration law while sanctuary cities like San Francisco 
decline to enforce it). 
 9. YULE KIM & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 22773, “SANCTUARY 
CITIES”: LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2011,0106-crs.pdf (presenting a report on 
sanctuary cities for congressional members and committees). 
 10. SAN FRANCISCO ADMIN. CODE ch. 12H, § 12H.1 (2010), available at 
http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=1069 (stating “[i]t is hereby affirmed that the City and 
County of San Francisco is a City and County of Refuge”). 
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the progression of the American sanctuary city movement since its 
inception. Section II also identifies numerous American sanctuary cities 
and presents current federal statutes addressing sanctuary city policies. 
Cities that advertise and promote a secure environment for all immigrants 
will undoubtedly attract illegal immigrants. The legal and ethical problems 
of protecting illegal immigrants should concern the American citizens who 
live in sanctuary cities as well as the citizens who may soon find their city 
becoming a sanctuary city. Section III focuses on San Francisco’s Sanctuary 
Ordinance and includes views from both sides of the sanctuary city 
argument. It also addresses the unconstitutionality of San Francisco’s 
Sanctuary Ordinance in light of the Second Circuit’s holding in City of New 
York v. United States11 and the California Court of Appeals’s decision in 
Bologna v. City and County of San Francisco.12 Section IV proposes that a 
plaintiff with standing should bring suit against San Francisco’s Sanctuary 
Ordinance, an ordinance unconstitutional in light of preempting federal 
immigration statutes.  
II. BACKGROUND 
 Examining the current controversy over American sanctuary cities 
necessitates an awareness of the history and progression of the American 
sanctuary city movement. Before actual cities of sanctuary existed in 
America, it was churches and individuals who offered sanctuary to refugees 
and illegal immigrants. 
A.  The History of American Sanctuary Cities 
1.  A Matter of Semantics 
In a shifting society, words do not always carry the meaning their 
speakers or hearers attribute to them. Because denotations and 
connotations change over time, the term “sanctuary cities” could present a 
problem for Americans who are not familiar with its current definition. 
Some Americans even furrow their brows in confusion because they have 
                                                                                                                                      
 11. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
challenged congressional statutes survived the plaintiff’s facial challenge), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1115 (2000). 
 12. Bologna v. City of San Fransisco, 192 Cal. App. 4th 429, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) 
(entering judgment for the City and County of San Francisco because the plaintiff could not 
premise her claims on 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) or the California Health and Safety Code section 
11369). 
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never heard the term. However, entering the search term “sanctuary cities” 
into an Internet search engine produces over two million results.  
At first glance, sanctuary cities might sound like a positive concept. For 
biblical scholars, the term inspires Old Testament passages about cities of 
refuge available to a person who had accidentally killed someone.13 In the 
twentieth century, the term referenced the Jews who were concealed and 
protected during the Holocaust or the draft dodgers who were hidden 
during the Vietnam War.14 For people living along America’s southern 
border during the early 1980s, the term referred to the protection afforded 
refugees fleeing across the border from persecution in El Salvador and 
Guatemala.15 Today, however, the term “sanctuary cities” connotes a 
different definition. 
The term “sanctuary cities” has evolved from the sanctuary movement 
that began in the early 1980s,16 but perhaps some people have carried the 
connotation through the movement while missing the shifting denotation. 
In a 2008 Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) report, the CRS 
explained that “the term ‘sanctuary city’ is not defined by federal law, but it 
is often used to refer to those localities which, as a result of a state or local 
act, ordinance, policy, or fiscal constraints, limit their assistance to federal 
immigration authorities seeking to apprehend and remove unauthorized 
aliens.”17 Regardless of their historical definition, sanctuary cities have 
evolved into controversial localities, generating constitutional questions and 
courtroom litigation. 
2.  The Progression of the Sanctuary City Movement 
The history of American sanctuary cities spans the years primarily since 
the 1980s when Americans near the United States’s southern border began 
                                                                                                                                      
 13. See Deuteronomy 4:41(King James) (describing how Moses set aside three cities that 
would be for anyone to find safety if he had unintentionally killed someone without evil 
intent). All Scripture quotations herein are from the King James Version, unless otherwise 
noted. See also Joshua 20:2 (relating how God directed Joshua to tell the Israelites to set aside 
cities of refuge for people to flee to if they had unintentionally killed someone). 
 14. Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 139 (2008) 
(discussing the historical background of sanctuary cities).  
 15. Id. 
 16. Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of Citizen 
Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 901 n.7 (describing the sanctuary movement as the 
movement of Central American immigrants to places of safety during the Reagan and Bush 
administrations).  
 17. KIM & GARCIA, supra note 9, at 1. 
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aiding and harboring Central American refugees, regardless of the refugees’ 
legal statuses with the U.S. government. This stirring of sanctuary efforts 
stemmed from church congregations and individuals; filled with religious 
and moral convictions, they were intent to care for refugees despite 
opposition or disapproval.  
a.  The American Sanctuary Movement Begins 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Refugee Act.18 Under the Refugee Act, 
immigrants entered the United States to escape persecution in Central 
America.19 However, the Refugee Act did not include “military operations, 
civil strife, or natural disasters” in its definition of conditions from which a 
refugee could be fleeing.20 If the United States rejected an immigrant’s 
application for asylum, then the immigrant would be subject to deportation 
if he remained in the United States.21 Dissatisfied with the United States’s 
denial of asylum to certain refugees, churches and individuals took the 
initiative to help the refugees.22 They provided shelter, clothing, food, 
transportation, and legal representation during deportation hearings.23  
In 1981 in Tucson, Arizona, a group formed a coalition of more than 
sixty local churches—the Tucson Ecumenical Council—and organized 
themselves into the Task Force on Central America.24 Jim Corbett, a key 
figure in the Tucson sanctuary movement, helped Central American 
                                                                                                                                      
 18. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006); see also The Refugee Act, 
ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES 1, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/policy/ 
refact1.htm (describing that the Refugee Act of 1980 was to provide “for the effective 
resettlement of refugees and to assist them to achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as 
possible after arrival in the United States”). 
 19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). Congress considers a refugee to be 
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and is 
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion. 
Id. 
 20. ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY 22 (1988) (presenting the story of the sanctuary 
movement in the United States and focusing on its beginnings with the Central American 
refugee movement). 
 21. Villazor, supra note 14, at 139-40. 
 22. Id. at 140. 
 23. Id. at 141. 
 24. CRITTENDEN, supra note 20, at 28. This author typifies the sanctuary issue as one that 
divides Americans into two camps depending on how they view America’s “place in the 
world.” Id. at xviii. 
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refugees across the desert and onto his ranch where he and his wife cared 
for them.25 After visiting Corbett’s ranch, John Fife, a local pastor at 
Southside Presbyterian Church, brought Corbett’s situation before a session 
with the church elders; the elders agreed to use the church to aid the 
sanctuary movement.26 Shortly after that decision, the church announced to 
its congregation that it would be a “sanctuary center” for refugees.27  
When the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) received 
rumors of the Tucson sanctuary movement, it warned the individuals to 
stop their sanctuary endeavors.28 The group considered halting its program, 
but that was not a viable option since the individuals felt they could not in 
good conscience stop helping the refugees.29 However, if they continued 
their work, the government could prosecute them and obtain the names of 
the immigrants they were assisting.30 Hoping to educate the public about 
their efforts before the possibility of prosecution, Corbett and Fife issued a 
public declaration asserting a moral and religious obligation to care for the 
refugees.31 In addition to the public declaration, John Fife sent a letter to the 
U.S. Attorney General, the Arizona U.S. Attorney, the Immigration Service 
in Tucson, and the Tucson Border Patrol.32 This letter announced Southside 
United Presbyterian Church’s refusal to follow Section 274(A) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, and the letter stated in part: 
 We take this action because we believe the current policy 
and practice of the United States Government with regard to 
Central American refugees is illegal and immoral. We believe our 
government is in violation of the 1980 Refugee Act and 
international law by continuing to arrest, detain, and forcibly 
                                                                                                                                      
 25. Id. at 55-56. 
 26. Id. at 56-57 (noting that Fife claimed, “‘We do not check green cards at the door; we 
meet people’s needs,’” and the session members agreed that their assistance should be given 
“as quietly and as unobtrusively as possible”). 
 27. Id. at 57. 
 28. Id. at 61 (describing how the sanctuary workers learned of the INS threat when an 
INS attorney pulled aside a political organizer sympathetic to the sanctuary cause and told 
her that the INS was not sure what “‘Fife and Corbett are up to . . . but tell them to stop or 
we’ll indict them’”).  
 29. Id.; see also Bezdek, supra note 16, at 941-42 n.155 (describing how some people 
justified their actions because they claimed they were doing what the government was failing 
to do—uphold the Refugee Act of 1980). 
 30. Bezdek, supra note 16, at 936. 
 31. Id. at 937; see also CRITTENDEN, supra note 20, at 61-62, 72-73. 
 32. CRITTENDEN, supra note 20, at 73-74. 
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return refugees to the terror, persecution, and murder in El 
Salvador and Guatemala.33 
This letter indicates the sanctuary workers knew they were violating 
federal law, but they considered that law subordinate to their moral 
obligations to the refugees. The INS hesitated to initiate action against the 
church and its members because it did not want to be regarded as the villain 
by arresting church members for their benevolent acts.34 Simultaneously, 
the INS faced pressure for allowing the church to defy the government’s 
refugee policy; meanwhile, the media started to portray the sanctuary 
workers as heroes.35  
Over the next two years, the INS conducted covert investigations in an 
attempt to convict Corbett and Fife.36 In January of 1985, almost three years 
into the sanctuary movement that Corbett and Fife began, the INS had 
sufficient evidence for a grand jury to indict Corbett, Fife, and thirteen 
other people involved in the movement.37 Still, some federal officials were 
unsure about prosecuting the members of the movement criminally 
because, other than alien smuggling, nothing indicated the members were 
guilty of criminal activity.38 Don Reno, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, 
wondered also about the negative repercussions of failing to prosecute the 
illegal activity.39 Almost a year and a half after the indictments, the jury 
delivered its verdicts.40 The jury acquitted Jim Corbett of all charges but 
convicted John Fife “of the conspiracy charge, of another felony for 
bringing an alien illegally into the United States, and of a misdemeanor for 
                                                                                                                                      
 33. Id. at 74 (declaring also that they felt a God-given right, in the name of justice and 
mercy, to aid those who were fleeing persecution). 
 34. Id. at 78 (noting the danger in arresting “church people” and possibly making 
martyrs out of them). 
 35. Id. at 77. In August, 1982, People magazine published an article on Jim Corbett and 
his immigrant smuggling efforts. Id. at 102. The article presented Corbett in such a way as to 
engender sympathy for his deeds. Id. In December, Corbett related the story of his sanctuary 
efforts when he appeared as a guest on CBS’s 60 Minutes. Id.  
 36. Id. at 169, 190. 
 37. Id. at 192. 
 38. Id. at 191. 
 39. Id. (expressing concern about the impression it would create if the Justice 
Department had gone so far and suddenly ceased the prosecution). 
 40. Id. at 322-23. 
182 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:175 
 
 
aiding and abetting the presence of an illegal alien.”41 When the judge 
pronounced the sentences for the convicted defendants, he did not give 
prison terms to any of the sanctuary workers; he gave everyone suspended 
sentences or probation.42  
b.  City Governments Adopt Sanctuary Policies 
While the Tucson sanctuary movement was facing discovery from the 
INS, more churches were developing interest in the sanctuary movement.43 
Congregations in other cities, such as San Francisco, were establishing their 
own sanctuary services for refugees.44 A Lutheran church in Berkeley, 
California; a Unitarian Universalist church in Los Angeles, California; a 
Community Bible church in Lawrence, New York; and a Lutheran church 
in Washington, D.C. all served as places of sanctuary.45  
The church sanctuary movement eventually led to local governments 
establishing sanctuary policies.46 For example, New York City and Seattle 
developed sanctuary policies that prohibited local government agencies 
from inquiring into or reporting immigration statuses to the federal 
government.47 These policies helped assure immigrants that they need not 
fear deportation if they approached the police to report a crime.48 These 
sanctuary practices began as protection for Central American refugees 
escaping persecution in their native countries, but they diffused to include 
all immigrants in the pool of protection.49 The federal government offered 
little resistance to local sanctuary city policies, and the policies continued.50  
                                                                                                                                      
 41. Id. at 323-24. After his acquittal, Corbett stated, “‘We will continue to provide 
sanctuary services openly and go to trial as often as is necessary to establish . . . that the 
protection of human rights is never illegal.’” Id. 
 42. Id. at 335. After delivering the sentences, the judge encouraged the sanctuary 
workers that although a trial was a means of getting their cause into the public eye, they 
should pursue their objectives through proper channels. See id. at 338-39.   
 43. Id. at 63-64 (citing a Lutheran church that suggested it was time for churches to be 
involved with the sanctuary movement as a way to enforce justice). 
 44. Bezdek, supra note 16, at 937 n.140. Some related the plight of the Central American 
refugees to that of European refugees during World War II. Id. at 924. 
 45. CRITTENDEN, supra note 20, at 69. 
 46. Villazor, supra note 14, at 142. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 142-43 n.62. 
 49. Id. at 143 n.63. 
 50. Id. at 143. 
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The sanctuary movement of the 1980s, led significantly by Jim Corbett 
and John Fife, helped establish the modern sanctuary city movement that 
goes beyond church members trying to help refugees escape persecution in 
their native countries. Modern sanctuary cities are no longer characterized 
by conscience-burdened church people covertly hiding refugees from war-
torn countries. Instead, entire cities publicly declare themselves as safe 
harbors for immigrants, “regardless of their immigration status.”51 
B.  Modern-Day Sanctuary Cities 
Again, basic Internet searches illustrate the public nature of modern 
sanctuary cities. Easily accessible lists of sanctuary cities attest to the 
willingness of cities to promote themselves as places of refuge and point to 
the ease with which illegal immigrants can identify the cities that allow 
them to live in the United States without the likelihood of discovery and 
deportation.  
1.  Examples of Modern-Day Sanctuary Cities 
Sanctuary cities employ express or implied sanctuary policies depending 
on the wording of a city’s policy. According to the National Immigration 
Law Center, more than a dozen states have cities employing sanctuary 
policies.52 California alone has over a dozen sanctuary cities.53 The website 
for the City and County of San Francisco lists several sanctuary cities in the 
United States, including Los Angeles, California; Denver, Colorado; Miami, 
Florida; Chicago, Illinois; Baltimore, Maryland; Detroit, Michigan; New 
York, New York; and Durham, North Carolina.54 Some cities incorporate a 
                                                                                                                                      
 51. Frequently Asked Questions, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, no. 3, 
http://www.sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=1072 (last visited October 20, 2011) (noting that San 
Francisco wants all immigrants to feel safe from fear of possible investigation when they seek 
to obtain certain public benefits).  
 52. See Laws, Resolutions and Policies Instituted Across the U.S. Limiting Enforcement of 
Immigration Laws by State and Local Authorities, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 
(Dec. 2008), http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/locallaw/locallaw-limiting-tbl-2008-12-
03.pdf (listing state-by-state the laws and policies that states have instituted to limit 
enforcement of immigration laws). 
 53. Id. at 2-5. 
 54. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 51, at no. 2. San Francisco’s city and county 
website lists the following as “just a few” of the sanctuary cities in America: 
Anchorage, AK Fort Collins, CO New York, NY 
Chandler, AZ DeLeon Springs, FL Farmingville, NY 
Davis, CA Miami, FL Durham, NC 
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“don’t ask, don’t tell” approach into their sanctuary policies,55 and in certain 
situations, officials may not inquire into a person’s immigration status in 
certain situations.56 One goal of sanctuary cities is to limit “the role of local 
law enforcement agencies and officers in the enforcement of immigration 
laws.”57 Since the federal government is responsible for enforcing 
immigration, local governments do not want their employees and officers 
interfering with the federal government’s enforcement of immigration 
laws.58  
New York City represents an implied sanctuary city because it employs 
sanctuary policies without expressly declaring itself a sanctuary city. In 
1989, the Mayor of New York City issued Executive Order 124, prohibiting 
city officers or employees from disclosing information about immigrants 
(aliens) to the federal immigration authorities unless (1) the officers or 
employees were required by law to disclose the information; (2) the alien 
authorized, in writing, the officer or employee to transmit the information; 
or (3) the alien was suspected of criminal activity.59 The Order also created 
in-between parties to evaluate any information about the alien that was sent 
to the federal immigration authorities; the in-between party would 
determine if the information should be sent to the federal authorities, and 
the officials and employees in the field were not permitted to send any 
information on their own.60 New York City law enforcement officers were 
still required to cooperate with federal authorities if officers suspected aliens 
of criminal activity, but law enforcement officers could not disclose 
                                                                                                                                      
Downey, CA Chicago, IL Portland, OR 
Los Angeles, CA Evanston, IL Brownsville, TX 
Oakland, CA Cambridge, MA Houston, TX 
San Bernardino, CA Baltimore, MD Salt Lake City, UT 
San Jose, CA Detroit, MI Fairfax County, VA 
Watsonville, CA St. Paul, MN Seattle, WA 
New Haven, CN Newark, NJ Madison, WI 
Denver, CO Albuquerque, NM Jackson Hole, WY. 
Id. 
 55. KIM & GARCIA, supra note 9. 
 56. Id. (noting that though a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach does not directly violate 
federal laws that require unhindered communication from local authorities to federal 
authorities, this approach keeps local authorities from discovering valuable information in 
the first place). 
 57. Id. at 2. 
 58. Id. 
 59. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 60. Id. 
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information regarding alien victims of crimes.61 Despite these policies, 
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani declared in 2007 that New York City was not a 
sanctuary city.62 He did, however, advocate the importance of providing a 
safe environment for illegal immigrants to feel secure enough to report 
crimes.63 Mayor Giuliani argued that a number of criminals would go free if 
illegal immigrants feared police retaliation after reporting crimes.64   
Another implied sanctuary city is Hartford, Connecticut, whose 
municipal code includes “Article XXI. – City Services Relating to 
Immigration Status.”65 This code pertaining to police matters mandates that 
(a) Hartford police officers shall not inquire about a person’s 
immigration status unless such an inquiry is necessary to an 
investigation involving criminal activity as defined in section 2-
926 above. 
(b) Hartford police shall not inquire about the immigration status of 
crime victims, witnesses, or others who call, approach or are 
interviewed [sic] the Hartford Police Department. 
(c) The Hartford Police will not arrest or detain a person based solely 
on their immigration status unless there is a criminal warrant. 
(d) Hartford police officers shall not make arrests or detain 
individuals based on administrative warrants for removal entered 
by ICE into the National Crime Information Center database. 
(e) The Hartford Police Department shall conduct necessary training 
and education to ensure that its officers are knowledgeable about 
provisions set forth in this article. 
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any 
Hartford police officer from cooperating with federal 
immigration authorities as required by law.66 
Hartford may not declare itself to be a sanctuary city, but like New York 
City, it places strict prohibitions on its law enforcement officers’ voluntary 
dissemination of immigration information to federal authorities. 
                                                                                                                                      
 61. Id. at 31-32. 
 62. Michael Luo, A Closer Look at the ‘Sanctuary City’ Argument, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 29, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/29/us/politics/29truth.html. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. HARTFORD, CONN., MUN. CODE ch. 2, art. XXI (2008), available at 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientID=10895&stateID=7&statename=Connectic
ut. 
 66. Id. § 2-928. 
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In contrast to New York City and Hartford, San Francisco represents an 
express sanctuary city.67 The San Francisco Administrative Code (“the 
Code”), Section 12H.1 states, “It is hereby affirmed that the City and 
County of San Francisco is a City and County of Refuge.”68 The Code 
mandates in Section 12H.2 that city funds shall not be used to gather or 
distribute immigration status information of anyone in San Francisco 
unless required by law.69 The Code does permit law enforcement officers to 
report anyone who is processed for a felony or is suspected of violating 
“civil provisions of the immigration laws.”70 However, there is a danger that 
criminal illegal immigrants will fall through the cracks or be ignored 
purposely by the local authorities because the Code prohibits law 
enforcement from voluntarily providing immigration information to 
federal authorities. 
Ignoring a criminal illegal immigrant purportedly led to the death of a 
San Francisco father and his two sons. In 2009, the plaintiff lost on her 
federal claims in the Northern District of California.71 The plaintiff’s 
husband and two sons had been shot and killed while stopped in traffic in 
San Francisco.72 The alleged killer was an illegal immigrant and member of 
a known gang,73 and San Francisco police had previously arrested him on 
                                                                                                                                      
 67. SAN FRANCISCO ADMIN. CODE ch. 12H, § 12H.1 (2010), available at 
http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=1069. Cambridge, Massachusetts, represents another 
expressed sanctuary city. In a City Council meeting on June 17, 2002, the Council reaffirmed 
Cambridge’s 1985 resolution declaring Cambridge to be 
“A Sanctuary City” in which city departments and employees are committed to 
protect refugees from: requests for information about, or conditioning receipt 
of city services on, citizenship status; “Investigations or arrest procedures, 
public or clandestine, relating to alleged violations of immigration law . . .”; and 
Deportation and dangerous returns to their homelands . . . .   
City of Cambridge, Mass., Amended Order (June 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.cambridgema.gov/ccouncil/citymanagersagenda/~/media/Files/ 
citycouncil/Agendas/2002/020617.ashx (cached copy that is opened as a PDF).    
 68. SAN FRANCISCO ADMIN. CODE ch. 12H, § 12H.1 (2010), available at 
http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=1069. 
 69. Id. § 12H.2. 
 70. Id. § 12H.2-1. 
 71. Bologna v. City of San Fransisco, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69985, at *23 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 11, 2009), remanded at 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89289, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 
2009) (noting that though the plaintiff’s federal claims had been dismissed, her 
remaining claims should be remanded to San Francisco Superior Court). 
 72. Id. at *2. 
 73. Id. 
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multiple occasions.74 The plaintiff contended that the officers failed to 
report the illegal immigrant to Federal Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) because San Francisco’s sanctuary policy prevented 
them from reporting.75 The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s federal 
claims for lack of standing.76 Nonetheless, while the plaintiff’s federal claims 
were not valid in this case, not reporting criminal illegal immigrants to ICE 
officials still presents the danger that criminal illegal immigrants living in 
the United States threaten Americans’ safety. In this case, if local law 
enforcement had relayed the information about the criminal illegal alien to 
ICE, ICE likely would have deported him and avoided this tragedy. 
2.  The Congressional Response to Sanctuary Cities 
Several years after the mayor of New York City signed Executive Order 
124, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act of 1996 (“Welfare Reform Act”).77 Section 434 (“8 U.S.C. § 1644”) of the 
Welfare Reform Act mandates that “no State or local government entity 
may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving 
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the 
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.”78 
The Conference Report to the bill explains that  
[t]he conferees intend to give State and local officials the 
authority to communicate with the INS regarding the presence, 
whereabouts, or activities of illegal aliens. This provision is 
                                                                                                                                      
 74. Id. at *3. 
 75. Id. at *3-4. 
 76. Id. at *12-13. The plaintiff presented an equal protection challenge, claiming that 
San Francisco’s sanctuary policy treated United States citizens and illegal immigrants 
differently by reporting the citizens who aided illegal immigrants and ignoring the illegal 
immigrants. Id. at *10-11. The district court held that the plaintiff did not have standing to 
bring the claim on behalf of other United States citizens, and the plaintiff’s claim was not 
traceable to this alleged differential treatment. Id. at *12-13. The plaintiff’s claim also failed 
on an alleged equal protection violation when the district court determined that the plaintiff 
failed to show more than a “disparate impact” because of San Francisco authorities not 
reporting the illegal alien to ICE. Id. at *14. The plaintiff also waged a due process claim 
based on San Francisco’s putting the plaintiff and her family in danger by instructing police 
officers not to report the illegal alien to ICE. Id. at *16. The court held that due process did 
not impose on San Francisco a duty to the entire population of San Francisco. Id.  
 77. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 
110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 78. 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2006). 
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designed to prevent any State or local law, ordinance, executive 
order, policy, constitutional provision, or decision of any Federal 
or State court that prohibits or in any way restricts any 
communication between State and local officials and the INS. The 
conferees believe that immigration law enforcement is as high a 
priority as other aspects of Federal law enforcement, and that 
illegal aliens do not have the right to remain in the United States 
undetected and unapprehended.79  
The Welfare Reform Act did not mandate that local authorities had to 
communicate, but local authorities could not be denied the option to 
communicate.  
Additionally, Congress signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“Immigration Reform Act”).80 
Section 642 (“8 U.S.C. § 1373”) of the Immigration Reform Act determined 
that a “Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not 
prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from 
sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or 
unlawful, of any individual.”81 These federal statutes do not require local 
authorities to regulate immigration, but they ensure local authorities cannot 
prevent local agencies or employees from voluntarily reporting immigration 
information. The statutes present a problem for cities like San Francisco 
that seek to prevent local law enforcement from disseminating immigration 
status information to federal authorities. The federal government is 
concerned with Arizona’s strict immigration policy, but it should be equally 
concerned with cities that follow implied or express sanctuary policies that 
are in direct violation of federal statutes. 
The American sanctuary city movement has evolved since the Tucson 
church group in the 1980s. It transitioned from Fife and Corbett’s morally-
driven view of refugee protection to New York City’s refusing to enforce 
anything more than what federal law expressly requires. Next, Congress 
mandated that local governments not prevent employees from 
communicating with federal immigration authorities regarding the 
                                                                                                                                      
 79. H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 313 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2649, 2771, 1996 WL 443732 (emphasis added).  
 80. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)  
 81. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 642, 8 
U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2010). 
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immigration status of individuals within the country. The current concern 
is whether cities should continue to hide behind the federal government’s 
complacency with their policies that prohibit local law enforcement and 
other employees from voluntarily giving immigration information to 
federal immigration authorities unless required by law.  
III.  PROBLEM 
In response to Arizona’s immigration law,82 President Obama declared 
that ‘“a state may not establish its own immigration policy or enforce state 
laws in a manner that interferes with the federal immigration laws.”83 
Ironically, while Arizona attempts to strictly enforce immigration laws, 
cities like San Francisco attempt to establish their own immigration policies 
by prohibiting law enforcement officers or other officials from voluntarily 
assisting with immigration enforcement.84 Supporters of sanctuary cities 
stand behind the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty85 while 
opponents of sanctuary cities rely on the Supremacy Clause86 and federal 
preemption.  
A.  Opposing Views of Sanctuary Cities 
Supporters of sanctuary cities allege that sanctuary policies are more 
effective than strict immigration policies at promoting strong and safe 
communities.87 They believe sanctuary cities do not contravene the United 
States Constitution because states are merely exercising their rights under 
the Tenth Amendment. Nevertheless, opponents of sanctuary policies claim 
                                                                                                                                      
 82. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).  
 83. Saunders, supra note 8. 
 84. Id.  
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”). 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding”). 
 87. KIM & GARCIA, supra note 9, at 2-3 (stating that supporters argue immigration 
enforcement is a federal responsibility and that “local efforts to deter the presence of 
unauthorized aliens would undermine community relations, disrupt municipal services, 
interfere with local enforcement, or violate humanitarian principles”). 
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such policies violate federal law because the federal government retains 
control over immigration.88 
1.  Support for Sanctuary Cities 
The paramount concern for supporters of sanctuary cities is the belief 
that sanctuary cities foster a cooperative spirit that leads to safety in the 
community. They contend that illegal immigrants will not approach police 
to report crimes if they fear investigation and deportation.89 They also argue 
that an absence of sanctuary-like policies will strip justice away from crime 
victims because “‘they have a justifiable fear that their lack of immigration 
status will trump the criminal justice protections afforded crime victims 
under the law.’”90 Proponents also purport that sanctuary policies prevent 
racial profiling and keep local authorities from deciding constitutional 
questions of authority or dealing with the financial restraints of enforcing 
immigration law.91   
                                                                                                                                      
 88. The biblical mandate for civil government represents another issue opponents can 
raise. As Creator of the world, God is the ultimate law-giver. See Genesis 1:1. Just as a 
sculptor has authority over his creation, God, as Creator and Sustainer of man, holds the 
authority to establish the laws that govern man, His creation; these laws, viewed through the 
lens of Scripture and applied to human and societal conditions, are collectively referred to as 
natural law. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *26 (stating that the “will of his 
Maker is called the law of nature”). Man’s laws should never run contrary to natural law 
because to contravene the laws of nature would be to contravene God’s laws. These laws are 
given through the Bible and the principles it sets forth. Romans directs that everyone should 
be subject to their governing authorities because God put those authorities in place. Romans 
13:1. The government’s priority is to punish evil and promote good. Romans 13:3-4. 
Governments enact laws to preserve an ordered system and protect the public; under this 
ordered system, criminals are punished for breaking these laws. The government has enacted 
laws to control immigration, and immigrants who choose not to abide by those laws risk the 
consequences. Sanctuary cities protect immigrants from the consequences of immigration 
laws. Criminal illegal immigrants choose to break the law, and sanctuary cities protect such 
criminals by providing a safe harbor from federal immigration authorities who will 
investigate and possibly deport the criminals. 
 89. Laura Sullivan, Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the Threat Posed to Sanctuary 
Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National Crime Information Center 
Database, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 567, 579 (2009). 
 90. Lynn Tramonte, Debunking the Myth of “Sanctuary Cities,” IMMIGRATION POLICY 
CTR. (Apr. 26, 2006), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/debunking-myth-
sanctuary-cities (advocating for sanctuary policies and quoting Leslye Orloff, Director of the 
Immigrant Women Program of Legal Momentum and Co-Founder of the National Network 
of End Violence Against Women in her testimony before Congress). 
 91. Sullivan, supra note 89, at 578-79 (proffering a list of social and philosophical 
reasons for allowing sanctuary cities, but focusing on the aspect of community cooperation). 
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Supporters of sanctuary cities claim the Tenth Amendment prevents the 
federal government from commandeering local governments to assist with 
federal responsibilities such as immigration enforcement.92 In 1992, the U.S. 
Supreme Court determined that the federal government could offer 
incentives for states to comply with federal programs, but the federal 
government could not compel states to enact or administer federal 
programs.93 Since the Tenth Amendment gives to the states powers not 
reserved for the federal government, the argument is that immigration 
belongs to the federal government and states should not be required to 
assist with immigration enforcement.94  
2.  Opposition to Sanctuary Cities 
Opponents of sanctuary cities argue that sanctuary city policies violate 
federal law by prohibiting local officials and law enforcement agencies from 
reporting illegal immigrants to federal immigration authorities.95 When 
Congress passed the Welfare Reform Act,96 it determined through 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1644 that 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local 
law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in 
                                                                                                                                      
 92. KIM & GARCIA, supra note 9, at 4.  
 93. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992) (determining that Congress 
may use monetary incentives to encourage states to support federal programs). The Supreme 
Court also recognized that “[s]tate governments are neither regional offices nor 
administrative agencies of the Federal Government.” Id. at 188. 
 94. Sanctuary Cities also oppose the controversial Secure Communities Program 
launched by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in 2009. See Secure Communities, U.S. 
CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ 
(providing information regarding the Secure Communities Program such as its mission and 
background and links to resources and contact information). Under the Secure 
Communities Program, fingerprints of anyone arrested and processed into local custody will 
be checked against FBI criminal records databases and Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) immigration records. Id. (explaining that while local law enforcement fingerprint 
records are traditionally checked against the Department of Justice’s records, the Secure 
Communities Program will additionally check fingerprints against DHS immigration 
records). If fingerprints match DHS records, ICE can evaluate and prioritize a criminal 
alien’s status to more efficiently effectuate identification and removal. Id. (noting that “ICE 
prioritizes the removal of criminal aliens, those who pose a threat to public safety, and repeat 
immigrant violators”). 
 95. Saunders, supra note 8. 
 96. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 
110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
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any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding 
the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the 
United States.97 
8 U.S.C. § 1644 makes it unlawful for cities to prohibit law enforcement 
officers or officials from reporting illegal immigrants to federal authorities. 
8 U.S.C. § 1644 does not dictate that local governments must share 
immigration status information; instead, the statute mandates that local 
governments cannot prohibit officers from sharing information. In the face 
of federal statutes mandating to the contrary, the City and County of San 
Francisco maintains a sanctuary policy contravening federal law.98  
B.  San Francisco’s Sanctuary City Ordinance 
The City and County of San Francisco’s (“San Francisco”) website 
publicly declares San Francisco to be a sanctuary city,99 and San Francisco’s 
former mayor, Gavin Newsom, issued an executive order in 2007 that called 
for protocol and training in the sanctuary ordinance.100 San Francisco’s 
sanctuary city policies are in place to assure “immigrants” they will not be 
reported to federal authorities if they seek health services, report crimes, or 
enroll their children in schools.101 San Francisco asserts that law 
enforcement officials do not usually share information with federal 
immigration authorities, but they will share information when arresting 
someone for a felony offense, or someone with a prior felony offense, if they 
become aware that someone they have arrested is an undocumented 
immigrant.102  
                                                                                                                                      
 97. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 § 434, 8 U.S.C. § 
1644 (2006). 
 98. Saunders, supra note 8. The United States Supreme Court has held that Congress 
has authority “to regulate matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation.” New 
York, 505 U.S. at 178. 
 99. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 51, at no. 1 (declaring that San Francisco 
passed a “‘City and County of Refuge’” Ordinance in 1989, which “prohibits City employees 
from helping Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) with immigration investigations 
or arrests unless such help is required by federal or state law or a warrant”).  
 100. Id. (noting that this exemplified San Francisco’s commitment to immigrant 
communities). 
 101. Id. at no. 3. 
 102. Id. at no. 5. This section, Frequently Asked Questions, of San Francisco’s website 
does not use the term “illegal” immigrant and refers only once to “undocumented” 
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While San Francisco declares itself a city and county of refuge and 
defends its Sanctuary Ordinance and the philosophy behind the 
Ordinance,103 San Francisco’s Ordinance fails under the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals’s analysis in a case involving a substantially similar 
sanctuary policy in New York City.  
1.  The Second Circuit’s Analysis in City of New York v. United States 
In 1997, the City of New York (“the City”) brought an action against the 
United States, claiming that Section 434 and Section 642 (“8 U.S.C. § 1644” 
and “8 U.S.C. § 1373”) were unconstitutional because they violated the 
Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause of Article IV.104 The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that 8 
U.S.C. § 1644 and 8 U.S.C. § 1373 did not violate either the Tenth 
Amendment or the Guarantee Clause.105 The City appealed, and the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals considered the City’s Tenth Amendment and 
Guarantee Clause claims.106  
The City did not dispute Congress’s authority to “legislate on the subject 
of aliens.”107 Rather, the City disputed Congress’s authority to “regulate 
aliens in a way that forbids states and localities from enacting laws that 
essentially restrict state and local officials from cooperating in the federal 
regulation of aliens, even on a voluntary basis.”108 The City claimed the 
Tenth Amendment’s grant of state sovereignty gave the City authority to 
decline to participate in federal programs and the authority to prohibit 
“agencies, officials, and employees” from assisting with federal programs 
                                                                                                                                      
immigrants when referring to the possibility of officers reporting undocumented immigrants 
for felony offenses if their undocumented status becomes known to the officers. 
 103. Id. at no. 6.  San Francisco’s website includes the frequently asked question of “How 
does the Sanctuary Ordinance benefit San Francisco?” Id. The answer purported on the 
website is that “[t]he Sanctuary Ordinance helps to maintain the stability of our 
communities. It keeps our communities safe by making sure all residents feel comfortable 
calling the Police and Fire Departments during emergencies. It keeps our families and 
workforce healthy by providing safe access to schools, clinics and other City services.” Id. 
 104. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1999). The City of New 
York maintained that the federal government’s control over immigration did not extend to 
controlling the City’s power over its employees. Id. The Guarantee Clause states that “[t]he 
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government[.]” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  
 105. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 33. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 34. 
 108. Id. 
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(even voluntarily).109 The City also claimed that the federal government 
could not legislate in such a way as to interrupt local government 
operations.110 The City relied on New York v. United States111 and Printz v. 
United States112 to argue that states retain the right to choose whether to 
involve themselves with federal programs and whether to allow employees 
to participate voluntarily in such programs.113  
The Second Circuit declined to read New York v. United States and 
Printz as broadly as the City suggested; instead, the Second Circuit read 
these cases to distinguish between conscripting state employees to 
participate in executing federal programs and simply prohibiting states from 
restricting their employees from voluntarily providing information.114 The 
Second Circuit determined that 8 U.S.C. § 1644 and 8 U.S.C. § 1373 do not 
conscript states or state employees to “enact or administer any federal 
regulatory program.”115 Instead, the statutes mandate that states cannot 
prevent employees from voluntarily providing immigration information to 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).116 The Second Circuit 
explained, “The City’s sovereignty argument asks us to turn the Tenth 
Amendment’s shield against the federal government’s using state and local 
governments to enact and administer federal programs into a sword 
allowing states and localities to engage in passive resistance that frustrates 
                                                                                                                                      
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. The Second Circuit briefly considered the City’s Guarantee Clause claim and 
determined that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1644 and 1373 did not impermissibly interfere with the City’s 
Executive Order and did not violate the City’s republican form of government because they 
“in no way” altered the City’s government. Id. at 37.  
 111. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that “[t]he Federal 
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory 
program. . . . The Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state regulation 
contrary to federal interests.”). 
 112. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that “[t]he Federal 
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, 
nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or 
enforce a federal regulatory program”). 
 113. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 35. 
 114. Id. (emphasis added) (noting that “while Congress may condition federal funding on 
state compliance with a federal regulatory scheme or preempt state powers in particular 
areas . . . it may not directly force states to assume enforcement or administrative 
responsibilities constitutionally vested in the federal government”). 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
2011] HIDDEN BENEATH THE WAVES OF IMMIGRATION DEBATE 195 
 
 
federal programs.”117 The court went on to iterate how the dual 
sovereignties of state and federal governments cannot coexist if they hold 
each other in a deadlock by refusing to cooperate with each other.118 The 
Supremacy Clause restricts states from thwarting federal regulatory 
programs and puts an end to any potential deadlock.119 The Second Circuit 
held that the Tenth Amendment did not give New York City the right to 
prevent its employees from voluntarily offering immigration information to 
the INS.120  
2.  The Parallel Between San Francisco’s Ordinance and New York 
City’s Ordinance  
In light of the Second Circuit’s holding in City of New York, that Sections 
434 and 642 are constitutional and preempt states’ attempts at contrary 
legislation, San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance is unconstitutional 
because it prohibits what Congress determined states may not prohibit. San 
Francisco’s City and County of Refuge Ordinance provides in part that 
[n]o department, agency, commission, officer or employee of the 
City and County of San Francisco shall use any City funds or 
resources to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law 
or to gather or disseminate information regarding the 
immigration status of individuals in the City and County of San 
Francisco unless such assistance is required by federal or State 
statute, regulation or court decision. The prohibition set forth in 
this Chapter shall include, but shall not be limited to:  
(a) Assisting or cooperating, in one’s official capacity, with any 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) investigation, 
detention, or arrest procedures, public or clandestine, relating to 
alleged violations of the civil provisions of the federal 
immigration law . . . .   
                                                                                                                                      
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. New York City also argued that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1644 and 1373 interfere with local 
government by regulating the City’s control over information it obtains and by interfering 
with the City’s control of its workforce. Id. at 36. The court recognized the validity of the 
City’s desire to protect its confidential information and to retain control of its workforce, but 
it found that the City failed to make a case under its Executive Order. Id. at 36. The Executive 
Order precluded employees from giving information only to the INS, so the confidentiality 
of its information was not protected from any other dissemination. Id. at 36-37. 
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(c) Requesting information about, or disseminating information 
regarding, the immigration status of any individual, or 
conditioning the provision of services or benefits by the City and 
County of San Francisco upon immigration status, except as 
required by federal or State statute or regulation, City and 
County public assistance criteria, or court decision.121 
San Francisco’s sanctuary ordinance is analogous to New York City’s 
Executive Order 124 that states 
a. No City officer or employee shall transmit information 
respecting any alien to federal immigration authorities unless   
(1) such officer’s or employee’s agency is required by law to 
disclose information respecting such alien, or   
(2) such agency has been authorized, in writing signed by such 
alien, to verify such alien’s immigration status, or   
(3) such alien is suspected by such agency of engaging in 
criminal activity, including an attempt to obtain public assistance 
benefits through the use of fraudulent documents.  
c. Enforcement agencies, including the Police Department and 
the Department of Correction, shall continue to cooperate with 
federal authorities in investigating and apprehending aliens 
suspected of criminal activity. However, such agencies shall not 
transmit to federal authorities information respecting any alien 
who is the victim of a crime.122 
In City of New York, the Second Circuit held that “states do not retain 
under the Tenth Amendment an untrammeled right to forbid all voluntary 
cooperation by state or local officials with particular federal programs.”123 
The Second Circuit described New York City’s Executive Order 124 as a 
“mandatory non-cooperation directive relating solely to a particular federal 
program,”124 which is the precise manner of directive San Francisco 
employs in its Sanctuary Ordinance. The Second Circuit described Sections 
434 and 642 as “valid federal measures that prohibit states from compelling 
                                                                                                                                      
 121. SAN FRANCISCO ADMIN. CODE ch. 12H, § 12H.2 (2010), available at http://sfgsa.org/ 
index.aspx?page=1069. 
 122. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 31 n.1. 
 123. Id. at 35. 
 124. Id. 
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passive resistance to federal programs.”125 San Francisco’s sanctuary 
ordinance reads much the same as New York City’s Order, and they both 
prohibit city employees from voluntarily disseminating immigration status 
information.126 While the City of New York pursued a facial challenge 
against Sections 434 and 642 as violating the Tenth Amendment, the 
Second Circuit held Sections 434 and 642 constitutional.127 Just as New 
York City’s sanctuary city policy contravened federal statues, San 
Francisco’s Sanctuary City Ordinance contravenes the same federal law and 
is unconstitutional.128 
IV.  SOLUTION 
In light of the Second Circuit’s holding in City of New York v. United 
States, San Francisco cannot continue to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1644 and 8 
U.S.C. § 1373 by prohibiting its law enforcement officers and other officials 
from voluntarily reporting immigration information to federal immigration 
authorities. Because it is unlikely that San Francisco would repeal its 
ordinance, a plaintiff with standing needs to secure an injunction against 
San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance and obtain a holding that the 
Sanctuary Ordinance is unconstitutional in light of Congressional Sections 
434 and 642.129 
                                                                                                                                      
 125. Id. 
 126. See SAN FRANCISCO ADMIN. CODE ch. 12H, § 12H.2 (2010), available at 
http://sfgsa.org/ index.aspx?page=1069; see also City of New York, 179 F.3d. at 31 n.1. 
 127. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 37; see also id. at 32 (noting that the Conference 
Report accompanying the bill manifested an intention to give State and local officials the 
authority to communicate with the INS regarding illegal aliens). 
 128. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that the federal 
government can “pre-empt state regulation [that is] contrary to federal interests”). 
 129. See Sullivan, supra note 88. The author suggests that sanctuary city policies remain 
popular in spite of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1644 and 1373 because no one has filed lawsuits challenging 
the policies. Id. at 576-76. Nevertheless, she recognizes the limited capacity of local law 
enforcement to enforce sanctuary policies in light of preempting federal statutes. Id.  
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A.  San Francisco’s Sanctuary City Ordinance Is Unconstitutional In Light of 
the Second Circuit’s Holding in City of New York v. United States. 
1.  The Second Circuit’s Holding in City of New York v. United States 
In 1999, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that 8 U.S.C. § 
1644 and 8 U.S.C. § 1373 were constitutional.130 The court held that 
Congress was not compelling state and local governments to “enact or 
administer any federal regulatory program.”131 Instead, Congress was 
prohibiting “state and local government entities or officials only from 
directly restricting the voluntary exchange of immigration information with 
the INS.”132 The federal government cannot force states to help with federal 
immigration programs, but states cannot prohibit their employees from 
voluntarily doing so. Contravening federal legislation, San Francisco’s 
Sanctuary Ordinance prohibits employees from voluntarily assisting with 
federal immigration programs.133 Section 12H.2 of San Francisco’s 
Administrative Code mandates that 
No department, agency, commission, officer or employee of the 
City and County of San Francisco shall use any City funds or 
resources to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law 
or to gather or disseminate information regarding the 
immigration status of individuals in the City and County of San 
Francisco unless such assistance is required by federal or State 
statute, regulation or court decision.134 
While Sections 434 and 642 do not require states to gather and 
disseminate immigration information, the statutes determine that states 
cannot prevent their employees from voluntarily doing so. San Francisco 
violates federal law by mandating that no employee shall use City funds or 
resources to assist in federal immigration enforcement. City funds and 
resources could include a City-issued cell phone, a City computer, or even 
on-the-clock hours during which a City employee notifies ICE of an illegal 
immigrant’s status. 
                                                                                                                                      
 130. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 37. 
 131. Id. at 35. 
 132. Id. 
 133. SAN FRANCISCO ADMIN. CODE ch. 12H § 12H.2(a), (c) (2010), available at 
http://sfgsa.org/ index.aspx?page=1069. 
 134. Id. § 12H.2. 
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2.  Comparing San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance to the Second 
Circuit’s Holding in City of New York v. United States 
Though the federal government cannot conscript state and local 
governments to enact or administer federal immigration programs, state 
and local employees should be free to assist the INS without fear of 
retribution from local or state authorities.  
Under the holding in City of New York v. United States, New York City’s 
Executive Order 124 did not prevail over Sections 434 and 642 because 
these statutes are valid exercises of constitutional authority. The court 
determined that the Supremacy Clause prevents “states from taking actions 
that frustrate federal laws and regulatory schemes.”135 8 U.S.C. § 1644 and 8 
U.S.C. § 1373, which preempted New York City’s Executive Order, preempt 
San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance because San Francisco’s Ordinance 
“frustrate[s] federal laws and regulatory schemes.”136 The federal statutes 
give local law enforcement the option to voluntarily report immigration 
information. San Francisco’s preventing that voluntary transfer of 
information frustrates Congress’s purposes in these federal statutes. 
3.  Comparing San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance to the Holding in 
Bologna v. City & County of San Francisco 
Though San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance has been in effect since 
1989, a plaintiff with standing to bring a claim could challenge the validity 
of the Ordinance in federal court.137 In 2009, the plaintiff in Bologna v. City 
& County of San Francisco138 included San Francisco’s Ordinance in her 
claim, but she did so on equal protection and due process grounds.139 The 
plaintiff claimed that San Francisco violated the Equal Protection Clause by 
treating illegal immigrants differently from U.S. citizens and by failing to 
notify federal immigration authorities of the arrest of the criminal illegal 
                                                                                                                                      
 135. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 35. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To have constitutional 
standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact that is (1) concrete and 
particularized and (2) actual or imminent. Id. at 560-61. There must also be a causal 
connection between an injury that is fairly traceable to the action in question. Id. Finally, 
there must be a likelihood of the court’s decision redressing the harm. Id. 
 138. Bologna v. City of San Fransisco, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69985 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 
2009). 
 139. Id. at *10-15.  
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immigrant who allegedly murdered the plaintiff’s family.140 Because the 
plaintiff could not demonstrate that San Francisco had infringed on her 
equal protection and due process rights, the court found that she lacked 
standing to bring a claim.141  
When the case was remanded to state court, the California Court of 
Appeals considered the plaintiff’s tort claims against the city of San 
Francisco.142 The plaintiff alleged violations of the California Health and 
Safety Code and 8 U.S.C. § 1373.143 Section 11369 of the Health and Safety 
Code mandates that upon reason to believe a person arrested for certain 
drug offenses might not be a United States citizen, the arresting agency shall 
notify the United States agency having authority over deportation.144 The 
plaintiff contended that San Francisco’s sanctuary city policy prevented 
                                                                                                                                      
 140. Id. at *11. The court noted that the illegal alien had been arrested several times for 
violent crimes and drug offenses, was identified as a suspect in a murder, and was a known 
member of the MS-13 gang. Id. at *3. The plaintiff contended that the INS would have 
deported the illegal alien if local law enforcement had reported him to ICE. Id. at *3-4. 
 141. Id. at *11. The plaintiff could not demonstrate that San Francisco had treated 
similarly situated individuals differently. Id. at *13. She could also not demonstrate a 
violation of due process because her claim that San Francisco created a danger by releasing 
the criminal illegal alien was not particularized; instead, her claim included the entire 
population of San Francisco in the area of risk. Id. at *16. The court acknowledged the 
general rule that “the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative duty upon the state 
to protect its citizens against the acts of private third parties.” Id. at *16. The District Court 
for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiff’s federal claims with prejudice 
and ordered the parties to show why the case should not be remanded to state court. Id. at 
 *13.  
 142. Bologna v. City of San Francisco, 192 Cal. App. 4th 429, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
The plaintiff asserted San Francisco was liable under negligence theories under Evidence 
Code § 669 and Government Code § 815.6. Id. at 434. These sections present the elements to 
support a negligence cause of action. Id. Under Evidence Code § 669, failure to exercise due 
care is presumed if there has been a violation of a “statute, ordinance, or regulation of a 
public entity,” if the violation was the proximate cause of the harm, if the harm resulted from 
an occurrence of the nature which the statute was designed to prevent, and if the person 
suffering the harm was of the class of persons the statute was designed to protect. Id. 
Government Code § 815.6 applies to entities rather than individuals and provides that  
[w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment 
that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the 
public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately cause by its failure 
to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised 
reasonable diligence to discharge the duty. 
Id. 
 143. Id. at 435-38. 
 144. Id. at 435. 
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officers from reporting the criminal illegal alien to ICE, and the alien 
consequently was free to continue to commit crimes.145  
The California Court of Appeals considered principles of statutory 
construction to determine if the harm that occurred was the type Section 
11369 was designed to prevent and if the person suffering the harm was a 
member of the class of persons the section was designed to protect.146 The 
court looked to a decision by the California Court of Appeals in 2008 in 
Fonseca v. Fong.147 In Fonseca, the court looked at the legislative history of 
Section 11369 and concluded that the section “was enacted for the purpose 
of combating the sale and use of illicit narcotics.”148 The court concluded 
that although enforcing narcotics law could have an incidentally positive 
impact on reducing drug-related crime, the incidental benefits to the 
general public were not sufficient to consider that Section 11369’s purpose 
was to protect the general public from crime.149 
Considering the plaintiff’s claim that Section 642 also provides a basis for 
a tort action against the City, the court found that the Section was not 
designed to prevent the kind of harm the plaintiff alleged.150 The plaintiff’s 
failed claims in Bologna illustrate the difficulty of challenging San 
Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance. Yet under City of New York, a facial 
challenge from a plaintiff with standing could result in an injunction against 
the Ordinance and a holding that the Ordinance is unconstitutional.151 
                                                                                                                                      
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 436. 
 147. Id. (citing Fonseca v. Fong, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)).  
 148. Id. (noting also that a letter from the author of the bill to the Governor described the 
section as a narcotics bill rather than an immigration bill and the representatives who 
assisted in drafting the bill were all involved with enforcing narcotics law rather than 
immigration law). 
 149. Id. at 437 (noting that the plaintiff argued the legislative history did include a 
reference to language suggesting a goal of preventing violent crime; however, the court found 
this argument would not lead to a fair reading of the legislative history and further noted that 
more than narcotics violations would have been included in the section had the legislature’s 
goal been to prevent violent crime). 
 150. Id. at 439 (finding that Congress’s purpose was to eliminate “restrictions on the 
voluntary flow of immigration information between state and local entities and federal 
immigration officials” rather than to protect the general public against violent crime by 
illegal immigrants). 
 151. San Francisco cannot claim sovereign immunity from suit by the federal 
government, as it is commonly understood that the Eleventh Amendment does not protect 
cities from suit by the federal government. As stated in the Eleventh Amendment, “The 
judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
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B.  A Plaintiff With Standing Should Bring a Facial Challenge Against San 
Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance. 
Just as the City of New York sued the United States to obtain a holding 
that Congress’s statutes were unconstitutional, a plaintiff with standing 
could bring suit against the City and County of San Francisco.152 The 
plaintiff could present a facial challenge153 and seek a judgment that San 
Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates two 
congressional statutes that have been declared constitutional.154 As the 
Supreme Court determined in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,155 standing 
consists of (1) a concrete and particularized injury; (2) a causal connection 
that is fairly traceable between the injury and the defendant’s action; and (3) 
a likelihood of the plaintiff’s injury being redressed by a favorable decision 
from the court.156  
                                                                                                                                      
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another 
state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The United 
States has brought suit against the City of San Francisco in the past. See United States. v. City 
of San Fransisco, 310 U.S. 16, 16-18 (1940) (claiming San Francisco violated the Raker Act of 
December 19, 1913). San Francisco also cannot claim sovereign immunity from suits by 
individuals. See Bologna, 192 Cal. App. 4th 429; see also Larson v. City of San Francisco, 192 
Cal. App. 4th 1263 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (challenging a voter-approved amendment to San 
Francisco’s rent ordinance). 
 152. A mandamus action represents another option available to a plaintiff. For the court 
to issue a writ of mandamus, a plaintiff must have a clear and undisputed legal right to 
performance of the duty he seeks to enforce. 17 AM. JUR. Pl. & Pr. Forms Mandamus § 1. A 
writ of mandamus commands performance of a public official and will issue when there is a 
default of duty. Id. A plaintiff would likely seek a mandamus action against the mayor of the 
City and County of San Francisco to force him to perform his duty to comply with 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1644 and 1373. The plaintiff must also be devoid of an adequate alternative method of 
relief. Id. A plaintiff could alternatively bring an injunction against the ordinance because an 
injunction addresses a “threatened or contemplated omission to act.” Id. San Francisco’s 
Sanctuary Ordinance represents a threatened omission to act in accordance with federal law. 
 153. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that a 
plaintiff presenting a facial challenge to a legislative act must prove that the act would be 
unconstitutional under any circumstances). 
 154. Id. at 31 (holding that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1644 and 1373 survive New York City’s facial 
challenge). 
 155. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 156. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. The Supreme Court decided that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing because their claimed injury could be not be supported by anything more than 
speculation, and it was merely conjectural as to whether the action they sought would 
actually affect their injury. The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the restoration of a 
previous interpretation of a statute protecting certain endangered species. Id. at 558. The 
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A San Francisco citizen would face a difficult task showing standing 
because the citizen would, as the plaintiff in Bologna, potentially be claiming 
a general harm to all citizens of San Francisco. This is the kind of general 
harm the Supreme Court has determined does not rise to the level of an 
Article III case or controversy.157 However, as ICE represents the 
investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security and is tasked 
with immigration enforcement,158 ICE is an object of the action.159 A citizen 
plaintiff would rely on the interaction between San Francisco and criminal 
illegal aliens, but ICE would rely on its position in Congress’s statutes and 
San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance. Both 8 U.S.C. § 1644 and 8 U.S.C. § 
1373 mandate that local governments cannot prevent the voluntary 
dissemination of immigration information to the INS.160 The statutes give 
local law enforcement agencies authority to communicate with federal 
immigration authorities.161 San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance 
contravenes Congress’s purposes by preventing any voluntary 
communication of immigration information from local law enforcement to 
                                                                                                                                      
reading the plaintiffs favored applied to endangered species in foreign countries. Id. at 558-
59. The Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs would need to prove not only that the 
species were being jeopardized but also that the plaintiffs’ interests were injured. Id. at 563. 
Plaintiffs could not prove, however, that they even had concrete plans of visiting the foreign 
countries where they claimed they would be deprived of their opportunity to observe the 
endangered species, and the Supreme Court determined their injury was not actual or 
imminent. Id. at 564. Additionally, the plaintiffs could not show a likelihood of redressability 
because the only relief the district court could accord could not be sure to lead to the result 
the plaintiffs sought. Id. at 569. 
 157. Id. at 573-74 (noting that claiming a harm because of an “interest in proper 
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and 
tangibly benefits [the plaintiff] than it does the public at large” does not rise to the level of an 
Article III case or controversy). 
 158. ICE Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/about/overview. 
 159. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62 (explaining that a plaintiff who is himself an object of 
the action will have a simpler task of establishing standing than a plaintiff whose injury arises 
from the government’s regulating [or failure to regulate] a third party). 
 160. In 2003, the INS was abolished, and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection (agencies 
under the Department of Homeland Security) filled the void. Our History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “About Us” 
hyperlink; then follow “Our History” hyperlink). 
 161. H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 383 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2771 (emphasis added). 
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federal immigration authorities.162 Because Congress enacted Sections 434 
and 642 to allow communication between local and federal agencies, ICE 
suffers a concrete and imminent injury because San Francisco’s Sanctuary 
Ordinance directly contravenes Congressional legislation.  
ICE meets the second element of standing as its harm is directly 
attributable to San Francisco’s Ordinance. The Ordinance prohibits local 
law enforcement from engaging in the very act that Congress mandated 
local law enforcement should be allowed to engage in: voluntarily 
contacting the INS, or in this case, ICE. While the California Court of 
Appeals found that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 was not designed to prevent the harm 
the plaintiff in Bologna alleged, the statute was designed to prevent the very 
harm ICE would allege: San Francisco’s preventing local law enforcement 
from voluntarily sharing information with ICE. Finally, ICE meets the third 
element of standing because its injury would be readily redressed by a 
favorable judicial decision declaring the Ordinance invalid. Without San 
Francisco preventing local law enforcement from voluntarily sharing 
immigration information with ICE, officials would be free to voluntarily 
share such information if they so chose. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
America’s debate over immigration will continue to engender 
controversy. Some people will approve of Arizona’s immigration law while 
others will think Arizona has overstepped its bounds. Unlike Arizona’s law, 
San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance is not in the national spotlight; 
nonetheless, San Francisco cannot enforce an ordinance that violates federal 
law. San Francisco law enforcement agencies need the freedom to protect 
citizens by having the option to provide immigration information to federal 
immigration authorities. Federal statutes afford this freedom, but San 
Francisco’s Ordinance takes it away. San Francisco is free to work for a 
change in federal immigration law; but in the meantime, the City and 
County of San Francisco cannot enact its own ordinances that violate 
federal law. The legal system and San Francisco’s citizens deserve the justice 
that would be served if San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance were 
invalidated. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 162. SAN FRANCISCO ADMIN. CODE ch. 12H, § 12H.2 (2010), available at 
http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=1069 (prohibiting sharing of immigration statuses unless 
required by federal or State statute or by regulation or court decision). 
